企業稅收政策的製度與博弈分析(doc 11)

摘要 本文試圖尋找建立一種適當的征稅製度，利用這種製度，政府可以有效控製和約束企業的偷稅漏稅行為。運用“二人零和博弈理論”的相關知識，建立一個稅務局－企業的博弈模型，在這個模型中，政府作為博弈規則的製定者，完全有能力通過製定相應的博弈規則，而使雙方決策在納什均衡時自己的利益最大化。我們用Mathematica4.1軟件來幫助分析理解，尋找政府征稅的最優決策，以期規避信息不對稱、征稅成本高等不利因素的影響。在不增加企業負擔即不提高稅率的情況下，分析給出政府征稅的最優決策，以提高政府征稅效率，增加稅收收入。

關鍵字 博弈論；納什均衡；不對稱信息；機會成本；拉弗曲線；帕累托改進；帕累托最優

Institution and Game Analysis of Enterprise Tax Policies

Abstract This article intends to establish a proper taxation institution, with which the government can control and check business tax evasion in an effective way. Related knowledge of “zero sum two person games theory” is applied to establish a game model of taxation bureau-business. In this model, the government, as the drawer-up of the game rules, is by all means capable to maximize the benefits of both parties concerned on Nash equilibrium. With the help of Mathematica4.1 Software, an optimal policy of tax levy adopted by the government is to be found to evade some negative impacts exerted by information asymmetry and high-cost tax levy, etc. On the condition that business burden is not worsened, that is, tax rate is not raised, this article provides the optimal policy for government tax levy, so as to increase tax-levy efficiency of the government and tax revenue.

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