寡頭聯盟、外部效應與最優進入策略(DOC 10)

寡頭的競爭與合作行為是產業組織理論的基本研究對象。本論文的研究表明，當麵臨著潛在的進入者時，寡頭們就有可能從競爭對手變成合作夥伴，他們會結成聯盟共同對付入侵者。而這種結盟關係顯然地給進入者施加負的外部效應，使其處於不利地位，並導致進入者的策略反製。如果寡頭的聯盟內部存在交易成本，當進入者使用分而治之的反擊策略時，聯盟內部的利益衝突就會被放大，並且可能導致聯盟的失敗。這一結論能夠很好地解釋現實中導致寡頭聯盟的形成與解體的外部原因。
關鍵詞：寡頭聯盟，外部性，機製設計

Oligopoly Predation, Externality and Optimal Entrance
Abstract
Oligopolies have incentives to form coalition when they face potential entrance. However, the coalition will impose negative externalities on the entrant, and makes him worse off. As a response, the entrant wants to prevent coalition formation, employing the strategy of “divide and conquer”. His counter strategy will succeed when transaction costs exist in the coalition, and the coalition will fail due to the enlarged conflict of interest. These basic ideas in this paper can thus illustrate the forming and collapsing of oligopoly coalitions in industry organization.
JEL Classifications: C72, L13, L14

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